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BODY INTEGRITY IDENTITY DISORDER 
AND THE ETHICS OF MUTILATION 
 
Robert Song 
 
Introduction 
 
 Christian theology teaches the goodness of the material world, a goodness that was 
declared in creation, vindicated in the resurrection, and will be fulfilled in the world’s 
redemption. The material world includes the human body, and acceptance of the body as the gift 
of a good Creator, as something neither to be worshipped nor to be escaped, lies at the heart of 
Christian thinking about the practice of medicine. It has also grounded a critique of those 
technological modes of thought characteristic of the modern world that explicitly or implicitly 
suggest the desirability of disembodiment and celebrate the freedom of the self to live 
unencumbered by the fatedness of gross matter. 
 The critique of the technological mind-set is extremely attractive, and has rightly received 
much attention.1 Nevertheless in its outworking in relation to modern medicine, it runs certain 
dangers, particularly when it treats of certain experiences, standardly treated as psychiatric 
disorders, in which people find themselves in some sense alienated from and in conflict with 
their bodies. The most obvious example of this is the experience of transsexualism, where a 
person finds himself or herself feeling at odds with his or her anatomical sex. The affirmation of 
the goodness of the body might suggest that the clinical response must be psychotherapeutic in 
nature, and must eschew sexual reassignment surgery.2 Yet the case may not be so 
straightforward. I will explore this, not through a study of transsexualism, which involves 
broader questions of sexuality and gender, but through the much more unusual situation in 
which individuals desire the amputation of a healthy body part. By considering the 
appropriateness of a surgical remedy for psychological distress in this situation, we may be able 
                                                 
1 For an eloquent recent example, see Brian Brock, Christian Ethics in a Technological Age (Grand Rapids, Mi.: 
Eerdmans, 2010). 
2 See for example, Oliver O’Donovan, Transsexualism: Issues and Argument (Cambridge: Grove Books, 1982). 
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to shed some light on the proper role of medicine in a world which, though fallen, remains good. 
 
The making of a new diagnostic category 
 
 Some years ago Robert Smith, a consultant surgeon at the Falkirk and District Royal 
Infirmary in Scotland, defied received medical wisdom by performing an above-knee amputation 
of the perfectly healthy leg of a man who was evidently in great psychological distress and who 
was convinced that he would continue in this state until his leg was removed. A couple of years 
later Smith carried out a similar operation on a second person, but in response to hostile 
newspaper reports was subsequently prevented by his NHS hospital’s ethics committee from 
performing a third.3 He reported that the patients on whom he had operated apparently felt 
‘incomplete’ with four limbs, but believed that they would feel ‘complete’ if a limb was surgically 
removed. The results of the operations appear to have been remarkable: in both cases minimal 
post-operative analgesia was required, and the patients, whose lives and careers had previously 
been blighted by frequent depressive episodes, found themselves transformed and without any 
subsequent need for psychiatric treatment.4 
 The numbers of people who are gripped by the desire for the kind of radical surgery 
undertaken by Smith are exceptionally small, unsurprisingly, and until the advent of the internet 
were largely invisible to each other, to the medical world, and perhaps, in a sense, to themselves. 
Nevertheless there is now enough evidence to suggest a number of commonalities amongst 
them.5 The most commonly desired impairment is amputation, of one or more arms, legs, fingers 
or toes, though some wish to be blind, others to be paraplegic, others to wear plaster casts or 
orthopaedic braces. Many have lived with these desires since childhood, and for some the 
experience is related to an early memory of seeing an amputee or a person using crutches or the 
like. Those in this situation will often go to exceptional lengths to fulfil their desires, not only 
pretending to be disabled through the use of wheelchairs or opaque contact lenses or plaster 
casts, but in some cases endangering their own lives in a bid to be free of unwanted limbs. To 
take one example, the manager of an ice works was found by the police early one morning with 
                                                 
3 Clare Dyer, ‘Surgeon Amputated Healthy Legs’, British Medical Journal 320 (2000), 332. The patients had received 
psychiatric assessment, and the procedure had been discussed in advance with the ethics committee of the General 
Medical Council. 
4 Robert C. Smith, ‘Body Integrity Identity Disorder: The Surgeon’s Perspective’, in Aglaja Stirn, Aylin Thiel, Silvia 
Oddo (eds.), Body Integrity Identity Disorder: Psychological, Neurobiological, Ethical and Legal Aspects (Lengerich: Pabst 
Science Publishers, 2009), 41-8. 
5 The largest surveys to date are reported in Michael B. First, ‘Desire for Amputation of a Limb: Paraphilia, 
Psychosis, or a New Type of Identity Disorder’, Psychological Medicine 35 (2005), 919-28 (52 participants); and Rianne 
M. Blom, Raoul C. Hennekam and Damiaan Denys, ‘Body Integrity Identity Disorder’, PLoS ONE 7 (4) (2012), 
e34702. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034702 (accessed 13 March, 2013) (54 participants). Valuable web resources can 
be found at transabled.org and biid-info.org.  
3 
 
his legs crushed by an Archimedean screw, but holding a walking stick which he ‘happened’ to 
have with him and with which he had switched off the machinery. Both his legs were amputated, 
and he returned to work a mere three weeks later, using a wheelchair and apparently a happy 
man. Others are reported as having resorted to immersing their legs in dry ice, using chain saws 
on themselves, laying their legs on railway lines, shooting themselves in the leg, refusing 
treatment to reattach limbs, and so on.6 Just as intense as the psychological suffering can be from 
the unresolved tension of feeling incomplete (‘Can one’s head explode from BIID pain?’)7, so 
can the relief and lack of regret after having had an amputation similarly be profoundly felt. 
There are several reports of complete resolution by surgery;8 and there is some evidence that this 
is not regretted into old age – witness the statement of one 76-year old woman who had had a 
leg amputated at the age of 23: ‘living with an amputation is nothing compared with a lifetime of 
mental torment.’9 
 This phenomenon was first brought to the attention of modern medicine by the 
psychologist John Money in 1977,10 although evidence of someone wanting to have his leg 
amputated has been unearthed from the late eighteenth century.11 On the basis of two case 
histories Money, who was primarily a sexologist, deduced a connection between a desire to have 
one’s leg amputated and an erotic attraction towards amputees. The former he named 
‘apotemnophilia’ (literally, ‘love of amputation’), intending with this designation to categorize it 
as a paraphilia, an erotic obsession with becoming an amputee. As it happens, while Money was 
right to note the connections between amputation and sexual arousal for many of those affected, 
later work surveying larger numbers has suggested that the erotic aspect is not universal, and that 
even for those for whom it is present, in only a minority of cases is it the predominant 
motivation for seeking amputation.12 
 Other psychologists, noting that it is typically first experienced in childhood and that 
                                                 
6 Gregg M. Furth and Robert Smith, Amputee Identity Disorder: Information, Questions, Answers, and Recommendations about 
Self-Demand Amputation (Bloomington, Ind.: 1stBooks, 2002), 41-7; Robert Smith, ‘Less Is More: Body Integrity 
Identity Disorder’, in Stephen W. Smith and Ronan Deazley (eds.), The Legal, Medical and Cultural Regulation of the Body: 
Transformation and Transgression (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 147-57, at 148-50. 
7 http://twitter.com/wylz/statuses/8442830218 (accessed 13 March 2013). 
8 For a case history see Arjan W. Braam and Nicole de Boer-Kreeft, ‘Case Report – The Ultimate Relief; Resolution 
of the Apotemnophilia Syndrome’, in Stirn et al. (eds.), Body Integrity Identity Disorder, 70-6; and for a first-hand 
account, see Andrew Becker, ‘Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) and Me’, in ibid., 103-6. 
9 Smith, ‘Less Is More’, 155. 
10 John Money, Russell Jobaris and Gregg Furth, ‘Apotemnophilia: Two Cases of Self-Demand Amputation as a 
Paraphilia’, Journal of Sex Research 13 (1977), 115-25. 
11 See Carl Elliott, Better Than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New York: Norton, 2003), 214, citing 
Jean-Joseph Sue, Anecdotes Historiques, Littérraires et Critiques, sur la Médicine, la Chirurgerie, et la Pharmacie (Paris: Chez La 
Bocher, 1785). 
12 First, ‘Desire for Amputation of a Limb’. The case for understanding it as a paraphilia continues to be argued by 
Anne A. Lawrence (‘Parallels between Gender Identity Disorder and Body Integrity Identity Disorder: A Review 
and Update’, in Stirn et al. (eds.), Body Integrity Identity Disorder, 154-72). 
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some sufferers report the coldness and asexuality of their upbringing, have suggested that it 
might be a form of attention-seeking, deriving from a desire to receive the sympathy in their 
identity as disabled that was lacking to them in their early years. But these have not been found 
widely persuasive, partly because the desire to be impaired appears in many cases to be extremely 
stable and largely recalcitrant to any kind of psychotherapeutic intervention, but also because 
people typically keep these desires secret and will frequently spend many years at home 
pretending in the desired body shape long before venturing out into the open. Others still have 
tried to understand it as a body dysmorphic disorder, a preoccupation with a particular bodily 
feature such as the nose, hair or skin which the person perceives as being ugly or unattractive 
and which causes distress or loss of self-esteem of a magnitude sufficient to demand clinical 
attention. But again the disparallels are substantial, amongst them that those desiring 
amputations rarely see the body part as ugly, and are motivated not by the desire to be more 
socially acceptable or attractive but by the felt need to be more personally complete or 
authentic.13 
 The seeming failure of psychological explanations and the typical absence of other 
psychiatric symptoms (apart from depression, which is very likely better understood as a 
consequence of these experiences than a cause of them) has prompted a drift towards a 
neurological account. On this view the disjunction between the body and the experienced body 
image is the result of physical damage to the part of the cerebral cortex which correlates to the 
conscious representation in one’s mind of the shape of one’s body. This part of the brain is 
situated in the right hemisphere, which would make some sense of the observation that there is a 
disproportionate desire for amputations on the left side of the body. The desire for amputation 
would be the inverse of the phenomenon of the phantom limb, where a person experiences a 
missing or severed limb as somehow still present. On this account it is taken to be the result of a 
developmental neurological anomaly, which creates an internal mismatch and a consequent acute 
sense of inner tension that requires resolution, one that is felt to be most easily addressed 
through removal of the affected limb.14 
 There may well of course be multiple aetiologies of broadly the same set of symptoms, 
and it may be that an approach which integrates neurological and psychological perspectives will 
finally prove to be more plausible. However none of these capture another feature of the 
phenomenon, namely its effect on the individual’s sense of self. For most people the loss of a 
                                                 
13 See further Smith, ‘Less Is More’, 150-2. 
14 Paul D. McGeoch, David J. Brang and V. S. Ramachandran, ‘A New Right Parietal Lobe Syndrome?’, in Stirn et 
al. (eds.,), Body Integrity Identity Disorder, 225-37. Ramachandran sets this in a broader account of brain-body relations 
in The Tell-Tale Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Quest for What Makes Us Human (New York: Norton, 2011), 255-8. 
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limb is experienced as a catastrophe, whereas for those who yearn for amputation the same event 
is the object of intense longing. Because they have never known a time when they experienced 
the limb as their own, they do not regard the losing of a limb as adventitious or disastrous, but as 
an integral constituent in their sense of themselves. For this reason, the psychiatrist Michael First 
has proposed that it be regarded as an identity disorder; noting several parallels with Gender 
Identity Disorder, including discomfort with the anatomical identity, the frequency of role-
playing in the desired identity, and the success of surgery as a treatment in many cases, he 
suggests that it be designated Body Integrity Identity Disorder.15  
 The name has many attractions. In contrast with apotemnophilia, it suggests that it is not 
universally or primarily experienced as related to sexual desire. In contrast with amputee identity 
disorder, it indicates that amputation is not the only kind of desired impairment.16 As an ‘identity 
disorder’, it at least clarifies that it is not a psychosis and is not ordinarily accompanied by other 
psychiatric signs or symptoms. Yet it also carries its own problems. By being discussed and 
categorized within the disciplines of psychology, neurology and psychiatry, it also locates the 
problem within the body and mind of the deviant individual, and fails to ask the relation between 
the individual body and the social body. That is, it fails to question how the cultural context in 
which and by which individuals are significantly constituted itself has effects on the experienced 
reality of this kind of estrangement from one’s body. And by adopting the language of ‘identity 
disorder’, it suggests that there is a secure psychiatric understanding of identity, of what a well-
ordered identity might be, and therefore what might constitute a disordered identity. 
 
The bioethical discussion: respect for autonomy 
 
 For the majority of philosophical bioethicists who have addressed the questions 
surrounding the moral legitimacy of a surgical response to BIID, unquestionably the central 
                                                 
15 First, ‘Desire for Amputation of a Limb’, 926-7. First considers here the possibility that BIID be included in 
future editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), an eventuality that is likely to be 
precluded more by its statistical rarity than the imprecision of the diagnostic category. 
16 The same criticism could be made of the recently proposed ‘xenomelia’ (i.e. having an ‘alien limb’), the repugnant 
sound of which is scarcely calculated to ease the sense of shame and social isolation BIID sufferers already feel. 
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point of concern has been that of respect for autonomy.17 Of course other arguments have been 
canvassed.  Sabine Müller, for example, employs the principlism of Tom Beauchamp and James 
Childress to argue a case against surgery for BIID.18 On her interpretation of their principles, the 
principle of nonmaleficence allows an amputation to be carried out only if it is medically 
indicated, which is prima facie unlikely since amputation is permanent and is in response to no 
unambiguous medical need; the principle of beneficence requires that the benefit of the 
treatment outweighs the harm, but here she finds the alleged examples of patients who have 
benefited too few in number to be a reliable basis for surgical intervention (though she grants 
that this might be justified under the principle of beneficence in order to prevent potentially 
lethal attempts at self-mutilation); and the principle of justice would prevent public funding of 
elective amputations on the grounds of the costs of treatment, of lost income and tax, and the 
consequent financial implications for health and welfare provision. 
 These are all relevant considerations which would have to be taken into account in an 
overall assessment of the ethics of elective surgery for a person with BIID. However it is the 
question of whether BIID patients have autonomy which has excited most attention. Müller 
herself argues that they do not on the grounds that they lack substantial autonomy. Just as we 
would not accede to the demand for removal of the leg of a schizophrenic patient who was 
under the delusion that he was acting on the instruction of visiting aliens, so ‘[i]n all cases of 
BIID that have been investigated by psychiatrists, the diagnosis states that the amputation is 
obsessive or results from a monothematic delusion, comparable to anorexia, Capgras syndrome, 
or anankastic counting’.19 However her argument is not wholly persuasive. Of course each case 
must be considered individually, as in all assessments of capacity, and in every case the possibility 
of delusional or other psychiatric grounds for lack of capacity must be acknowledged. But the 
lack of correlation of BIID with other psychiatric disorders also needs to be noted.20 It is not 
clear that the desire to have a limb amputated is delusional: unlike those who suffer from 
                                                 
17 In addition to the articles by Müller and Savulescu discussed below, see for example: Annemarie Bridy, 
‘Confounding Extremities: Surgery at the Medico-Ethical Limits of Self-Modification’, Journal of Law, Medicine and 
Ethics 32 (2004), 148-58; Tim Bayne and Neil Levy, ‘Amputees by Choice: Body Integrity Identity Disorder and the 
Ethics of Amputation’, Journal of Applied Philosophy 22 (2005), 75-86; the articles collected in American Journal of 
Bioethics 9, no. 1 (2009); D. Patrone, ‘Disfigured Anatomies and Imperfect Analogies: Body Integrity Identity 
Disorder and the Supposed Right to Self-Demanded Amputation of Healthy Body Parts’, JME 35 (2009), 541-5; and 
Christopher James Ryan, Tarra Shaw and Anthony W. F. Harris, ‘Body Integrity Identity Disorder: Response to 
Patrone’, JME 36 (2010), 189-90. 
18 Sabine Müller, ‘Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID) – Is the Amputation of Healthy Limbs Ethically 
Justified?’, American Journal of Bioethics 9 (2009), 36-43. Cf Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of 
Biomedical Ethics, seventh edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
19 Müller, ‘Body Integrity Identity Disorder’, 40. 
20 Michael B. First, ‘Origin and Evolution of the Concept of Body Integrity Identity Disorder’, in Stirn et al. (eds.), 
Body Integrity Identity Disorder, 49-57, commenting on his own interview study: ‘apart from the desire for amputation 
this was a psychiatrically healthy sample’ (53). 
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somatoparaphrenia, who do not recognize one of their limbs as their own and maintain that it 
belongs to someone else, people with BIID fully accept that the limb is theirs.21 Nor is the desire 
necessarily clinically obsessive: at all events, obsessive desires that are of psychiatric significance 
need to be distinguished from mere persistent wishes, which need not as such indicate a lack of 
autonomy. 
 Even if those with BIID are otherwise psychiatrically healthy and do have substantial 
autonomy in at least some cases, does their autonomous desire to have an amputation create an 
obligation on medical professionals to supply what they demand? The case for respecting patient 
autonomy, even in controversial choices such as the elective amputation of healthy limbs, is 
made by Julian Savulescu.22 Appealing to both Kant and Mill, he argues that we should respect 
people’s autonomous decisions rather than refuse them on paternalistic grounds, even when 
these encompass such contentious behaviours as sado-masochism, requests for futile treatment 
or extreme body modification. This does not permit anybody to choose anything they like: 
people have an obligation to make rational choices, but those who disagree with them should 
seek to argue with them and encourage them to make more rational choices, rather than impose 
decisions on them. Thus, ‘whether an individual’s decision is ultimately respected (by doctors, 
family and friends) turns on whether that individual is competent or incompetent, not on 
whether the decision is rational or irrational’.23 There are constraints on whether an individual’s 
wishes should be finally decisive, but these centre on distributive justice, harm to others, and in 
some circumstances the public interest, not on whether others regard their choices as rational or 
desirable. 
 
The moral theological discussion: the goodness of the body 
 
 Savulescu’s argument represents a liberal autonomism of a particularly pure variety, and 
is one that is found widely attractive in contemporary bioethics. While others may calibrate the 
balancing considerations slightly differently from him (interpreting harm to others or the 
requirements of justice in more exacting ways, for example), the principle of respect for 
autonomy is pivotal – and indeed is becoming increasingly pre-eminent in many interpretations 
of bioethical principlism.  
 Yet the appeal to autonomy as the central axis of an ethic of body modification faces a 
                                                 
21 Bayne and Levy, ‘Amputees by Choice’, 81. 
22 Julian Savulescu, ‘Autonomy, the Good Life, and Controversial Choices’, in Rosamond Rhodes, Leslie P. Francis 
and Anita Silvers, The Blackwell Guide to Medical Ethics (New York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2006), 17-37. 
23 Ibid., 27. 
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fundamental problem. In relation to body integrity identity disorder, it ironically is unable to 
make intelligible any conception of the integrity of the body. Whether the idea of autonomy is 
interpreted by reference to the clinically-determined possession of capacity or in terms of one or 
another philosophical account of rational self-direction, it does not possess of itself the resources 
to enable an exploration of the question whether the body has any intrinsic intelligibility, and if 
so, what the moral implications of that might be. As a consequence, because of the final refusal 
of any constraints outside of the choosing will, constraints which this mode of thought can only 
construe as paternalism, the danger is constantly courted of degeneration towards a narcissistic 
or consumerist attitude towards the body. The body, instead of being in some sense integral with 
the self, is prone to becoming externalised, alienated and mobilised to serve the projects of the 
self. Such an understanding is incapable of capturing any sense of the goodness of the body 
beyond that which we contingently decide to award to it. 
 By contrast, in the Christian tradition the goodness of the body is declared to belong to 
its participation in the created order, a participation which entails that the body may never be 
volatilised into mere formless extension. Creation, as Oliver O’Donovan puts it, must be 
understood ‘not merely as the raw material out of which the world as we know it is composed, 
but as the order and coherence in which it is composed’.24 Creation has form and is in-formed: it 
has an intrinsic intelligibility that is in principle capable of being recognized and is not merely a 
projection of the active, knowing self. Creation is the gift of a good God to which human beings 
belong, which they are to love, and in which they are to live: the good is to be found in and 
through creation and its fulfilment, not in escape from it or denial of it. For O’Donovan this 
licences a recovery of the notion of the ‘natural’, which can to some extent be discerned without 
resort to revelation: according to this, there is point to saying that it is natural for children to be 
brought up by human beings and not by chimpanzees, and natural for babies to be born by 
natural birth rather than by Caesarean section, and natural for people to prefer pleasure to pain, 
health to disease, or life to death.25 
 This does not imply any quick or crude naturalistic ethics, nor any blithe or 
unhermeneutical assumptions about the body’s legibility, but rather that human beings are called 
to recognize that the body is in-formed, and are to seek to bear witness to that in-forming in 
their actions and dispositions. Thus in relation to medicine, however we finally decide to 
intervene or operate on our bodies, we may never treat them as so much matter, mere 
ingredients out of which we may form whatever strange devices might emerge from our fevered 
                                                 
24 Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order: An Outline for Evangelical Ethics (Leicester: Inter-Varsity Press, 
1986), 31. 
25 Cf O’Donovan, A Conversation Waiting to Begin: The Churches and the Gay Controversy (London: SCM Press, 2009), 90. 
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imaginations. We may not distance ourselves from them in such a way that we are freed to 
exercise an unfettered dominium over them that pays no attention to their formed nature, but 
rather we are to nourish and cherish them (Eph. 5.29). 
 Nor does this care for our bodies or recognition of the good that they express preclude 
any intervention at all in them. The invocation of the category of the natural may not be taken to 
be a means of short-circuiting the task of moral discernment. That we may properly talk of 
natural birth by contrast with Caesarean sections does not imply that Caesareans are never 
medically appropriate. The pangs of childbirth have been greatly increased because of the first 
sin (Gen. 3.16), and at times they may increase to the point at which surgical delivery is medically 
justified. The practice of medicine (and within that, of surgery) is precisely one of the ways in 
which we exercise responsibility towards our bodies in a world that is still groaning for its 
redemption. But this gives rise to the question: how are we to discern what kinds of surgical 
intervention might be a sign of responsive care, and what kinds might be a sign of an 
untrammelled technological manipulation of the body? Must we interpret the elective amputation 
of a healthy limb as an implicitly docetic denial of the goodness inherent in the body? Or in a 
fallen world might it be a medically justified response to the facticity of a mismatched mind and 
body? 
 
The ethics of mutilation 
 
 Within the tradition of moral theology these questions have been treated under the 
heading of the ethics of mutilation. Taking its bearings from Thomas Aquinas’s account in the 
Summa Theologiae, the discussion of the moral legitimacy of mutilation has sought to interpret the 
meaning of the given form of the body in the context of particular circumstances. The question 
we have to ask of it is whether it can furnish us with appropriate analogies which could help us 
with the detailed moral discernment that is required in the case of BIID. 
 Aquinas’s investigation appears in ST II-ii.65.1, and forms part of his exploration of the 
vices of injustice and within these, of injuries to the person. He appears to have had in mind at 
least three different kinds of situation: the use of amputation as a punishment by a public 
authority, the ascetic practice of those who have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the 
kingdom of heaven, and the surgical removal of gangrenous limbs in order to save a patient’s 
life. Each of these is addressed through the application of a basic principle: 
 
A limb is part of the whole body and it therefore exists for the sake of that whole, as the 
imperfect for the sake of the perfect. The individual limb must therefore be dealt with in 
10 
 
the way the benefit of the whole demands.26 
 
According to this principle, which was subsequently termed the ‘principle of totality’, if a 
particular part of the body is detrimental to the good of the whole body, then it may be removed 
for the sake of the body as a whole. And conversely, ‘if a limb is healthy and working in accord 
with its natural function, it cannot be removed without detriment to the whole body’.27 Applied 
in the penal context, Aquinas argues that this implies that just a person may be deprived of their 
life for major crimes, so they may be deprived of a limb for lesser crimes, since the whole human 
being is ordained to the whole community of which they are a part. Applied in the case of the 
ascetic, it implies that self-castration can never be justified, since the sin which self-castration is 
intended to guard against is grounded in the exercise of the will, and spiritual wellbeing can be 
ensured without need to resort to physical means of this kind. Applied in the medical case, it 
indicates that an individual may legitimately consent to the amputation of a limb that may 
potentially poison the body as a whole, and do so without reference to anybody else, since the 
health of each person is the responsibility of that person. 
 Aquinas did not of course have BIID in mind when he composed this article. When he 
writes of amputation of a healthy member, he is thinking of those driven by sexual urges to 
compromise their chastity. By contrast those who suffer from BIID are not spiritual giants 
giving up all for the sake of the kingdom of heaven, but ordinary people seeking some modicum 
of psychological resolution. Therefore despite his injunction that ‘in any other case [than those 
he explicitly accepts] it is quite wrong to mutilate another’,28 it would be wise not to strain his 
teaching beyond the natural arc of cases he might have anticipated. 
 In response to new circumstances since his time, there has inevitably been evolution in 
the tradition of moral theological reflection on the subject, and we need to investigate this to see 
whether it might illuminate the problem of surgical intervention in BIID cases. One major 
period when close attention was paid to the topic was during the middle decades of the twentieth 
century when novel questions were raised by techniques of organ transplantation. Much of the 
discussion was given over to establishing the validity of mutilation of a person for the good of a 
neighbour. Such operations might be needed, not only in minor cases such as would be required 
in the course of blood transfusion, medical experimentation, and the like, but were also used to 
argue for organ transplantations, so long as they were not disproportionately burdensome to the 
                                                 
26 ‘Dicendum quod cum membrum aliquod sit pars totius humani corporis, est propter totum, sicut imperfectum 
propter perfectum. Unde disponendum est de membro humani corporis secundum quod expedit toti.’ (ST II-
2.65.1). 
27 Ibid. (my translation). 
28 Ibid. 
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donor. These could not be justified by appeal to the principle of totality, it was persuasively 
argued in an influential article by Gerald Kelly, SJ, since this was a principle of subordination of 
part to the whole which could only be justified in relation to the physical body: it could not be 
applied to the body politic – evidently departing at this point from Thomas, who had justified 
the death penalty on this basis, as we have just seen – nor to the Mystical Body of Christ. Instead 
organ transplantation should be allowed as an exceptional case under the law of charity for the 
benefit of the neighbour.29 
 Mutilation of the body for the sake of the neighbour is not the salient issue in relation to 
BIID, but in the course of his discussion Kelly comments on a number of principles and cases 
which had been discussed by the manualists and which are of greater relevance to our concerns.30 
I will comment on a number of these under five points. 
 First, the general principle of totality is that mutilation of the body for one’s own good is 
permitted ‘when it is proportionately necessary or useful for the good of the whole (i.e. the 
person)’.31 Kelly’s gloss on ‘the whole’ as ‘the person’ might be taken here to affirm that 
mutilations can be performed for the sake of the whole individual, body and soul, which would 
of course be central to a discussion of surgery for BIID. That is, if amputation of a limb were 
being undertaken for the good of the whole person, rather than just as a physical response to a 
clearly physical malady, it might then be justified under this principle. However, given the 
context of Kelly’s general polemic against justifying organ transplantation by reference to the 
principle of totality, it may be safer to infer that ‘person’ here is being contrasted with ‘social 
whole’ rather than with ‘physical body’. 
 Second, following on some teaching of Pius XII that mutilations are permissible in order 
to avoid serious and lasting damage, Kelly infers that purely prophylactic surgical removals might 
be permissible, even of healthy limbs or organs: this might include the incidental removal of a 
uterus, for example, in the course of the resection of cancerous ovaries, if this were medically 
justified to prevent possible later complications. However, although we now have an explicit 
                                                 
29 Gerald Kelly, S.J., ‘The Morality of Mutilation: Towards a Revision of the Treatise’, Theological Studies 17 (1956), 
322-44. Cf. Albert R. Jonsen, ‘From Mutilation to Donation: The Evolution of Catholic Moral Theology regarding 
Organ Transplantation’, Catholic Social Concerns Lecture Series (University of San Francisco: Lane Center for 
Catholic Studies and Social Thought’, 2005). The reference to the Mystical Body of Christ refers to an effort from 
the 1940s to develop a version of ecclesial ethics which would justify organ transplantation between members of the 
Church, and therefore between all human beings, on the grounds that all members of the human race have been 
redeemed (Jonsen, 4-5). 
30 It should be noted that my use of Kelly in the present context is intended as a way of accessing some of the moral 
discriminations discussed in the tradition that might illuminate the case of BIID through providing relevant 
analogies. In doing so, I do wish to affirm the continuing significance of casuistry for moral theology, but do not 
thereby mean to endorse in detail Kelly’s method or conclusions, nor to take sides in the controversies of mid-
twentieth century Roman Catholic moral theology. 
31 Kelly, ‘The Morality of Mutilation’, 331. 
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example of amputation of a healthy body part, it is clear that he envisages unambiguously 
medical indications as justifying it: the self-report of the BIID sufferer, even when taken with 
their evident distress, would not obviously provide the same quality of evidential warrant. 
 A particular case, third, which involves amputating a healthy limb but does not assume a 
medical context or the exercise of clinical judgement, is the probably fictive example discussed 
by the manualists of the tyrant who offers to an unfortunate individual the choice either to cut 
off his own hand or to be put to death.32 Kelly affirms the broad consensus of the tradition that 
amputation in this context would be justified, suggesting also that this shows that it is at least 
‘solidly probable, if not certain’ that there need be no intrinsic connection between the 
mutilation and the saving of one’s life; that is, the necessity which connects electing to lose a 
limb with saving one’s life need not be the medical need of the physical body, but could be 
external (in this case, the will of the tyrant). While this may bring us a little closer to BIID, 
however, the difference still remains that in the one case we have the implacable will of the 
tyrant, a necessity external to the person whose limb will be severed, in the other we have an 
individual’s psychological condition which is likely to struggle to generate the same degree of 
necessity as a gangrenous or necrotizing leg on the one hand or a pitiless despot on the other. 
 More relevant still, fourth, might be the case of castration for abnormal sexual urges.33 
While this is similar to the situation discussed by Aquinas, the presentation in Kelly is secularized 
and medicalized, and refers not to self-sacrificial mutilation in the pursuit of spiritual goods, but 
to psychiatrically-assessed sexual disorder. Clearly his response here would be of great interest 
for our concerns; but unfortunately he does not stoop to pronounce explicitly on the principle, 
no doubt because of its connection with sterilization, and resorts instead to the observation that 
doctors are unconvinced of the effectiveness of the resort to anatomical castration. 
 Fifth, of all the cases Kelly considers, that which parallels the situation raised by BIID 
most closely is lobotomy, a surgical intervention for severe psychiatric conditions that became 
popular in the mid-twentieth century in preference to even more extreme procedures, and 
remained widely used, if of course controversial, until the arrival of modern antipsychotic drugs. 
Kelly quotes with approval an instruction to Catholic hospitals: 
Lobotomy and similar operations are morally justifiable when medically indicated as the 
proper treatment of serious mental illness or intractable pain. In each case the welfare of 
the patient himself, considered as a person, must be the determining factor. These 
operations are not justifiable when less extreme remedies are reasonably available or in 
cases where the probability of harm to the patient outweighs the hope of benefit to 
him.34 
                                                 
32 Ibid., 336. 
33 Ibid., 337-8. 
34 No. 44 of the revised edition of Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Hospitals, quoted by Kelly, 340. 
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Here we do finally have a situation in which casuistry addresses and approves a surgical remedy 
for psychological distress. Shrewdly Kelly recognized that medical progress might soon make 
lobotomies more or less obsolete, and that the technique was anyway questionable, but the 
affirmation in principle is clear.  
 
Surgical interventions for psychiatric disorders 
 
 Is this the analogy with BIID which we are after? The parallels are clear. There is a clear 
surgical intervention intended as a treatment for a psychiatric problem, which does not take the 
form of an amputation, to be sure, but does equally have major, irreversible consequences for 
the patient. In both cases surgery may only be performed after a full psychiatric assessment. In 
both cases surgery should be undertaken only as a last resort, if there are no lesser therapies 
available, and if the probability of harm should not be greater than the hope of success. If there 
is a difference it is that some of the conditions for which lobotomies were performed are more 
serious than BIID: schizophrenias and other psychotic and delusional disorders are typically 
considerably more debilitating and detrimental to everyday functioning. Yet even here the 
differences should not be exaggerated: on the one hand BIID is also very frequently 
accompanied by depression serious enough to give rise to suicidal thoughts, and in many cases 
leads people to undertake actions with an extremely high risk of incidental death; and on the 
other, lobotomies were frequently performed (and frequently had relatively better outcomes) in 
cases of affective disorders, obsessive-compulsive disorders, anxiety disorders, and a variety of 
other conditions of arguably broadly similar severity to BIID. 
 On the face of it, therefore, if the objection to surgery in the case of BIID is that it uses a 
surgical solution to address a psychiatric need, then the same objection ought to obtain in the 
case of the lobotomies that were endorsed for use in Catholic hospitals. And conversely: if 
lobotomies were at least on some occasions morally and medically justified, then so too should 
surgery for BIID be.35 
 This conclusion may seem counter-intuitive, or at the very least unexpected. Our 
instinctive, pre-reflective responses to each case may well differ quite considerably. On the one 
hand the instruction to the Catholic hospitals seems reasonable: at any rate if we regard 
                                                 
35 A defence of surgery for BIID by reference to the practice of lobotomy might not appear the most appealing of 
argumentative routes, given the reputation it gained (it was banned in the Soviet Union in 1950 on the grounds that 
it was inhumane). But this is not really relevant to the point of principle which we are concerned with, namely the 
moral legitimacy of surgery for mental disorders. 
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lobotomy techniques as problematic, we are likely to do so because of the variable levels of their 
success, or their side-effects, or the enforcement of medical power over patients which they 
represented, but not on grounds of the principle that they are a surgical response to a psychiatric 
problem. By contrast, many people’s initial response to surgery for BIID is questioning, if not 
downright hostile. 
 There are, I suggest two different reasons why the two situations intuitively may feel very 
different. The first is that they occupy places in two different cultural narratives. Lobotomies on 
the one hand, for all the ways they now seem repellent and violent, still represented an effort to 
find some form of alleviation of suffering for patients whose symptoms had resisted all previous 
efforts – it was intended as a more tolerable alternative to leaving those patients either wholly 
untreated and forgotten in asylums, or treated with only partial effectiveness with a variety of 
shock therapies and the like. Their therapeutic motivation seems evident. By contrast BIID lends 
itself to being represented as occupying a place in a cultural narrative about the growth of 
autonomy within bioethics, in which therapy is being gradually supplanted – or at least 
complemented – by consumerist attitudes towards medicine. As an example of this, one might 
consider Carl Elliott’s inclusion of BIID in Better than Well, a book on the intersection of 
medicine and American aspirations for self-improvement, amidst chapters on cosmetic surgery, 
Prozac, performance-enhancing drugs, and other enhancement technologies. The demand for 
surgery for BIID could be presented as another site where the anxious pursuit of authenticity 
amongst modern Westerners takes the form of bodily enhancement and the subjugation of the 
body to the socially-mediated quest for competitive self-fulfilment.36 
A second reason why lobotomy procedures and surgery for BIID might be thought 
different is that while lobotomies are surgery on the brain for psychiatric disorders, amputation 
of a limb is surgery on another part of the body. Of course both are surgical interventions to deal 
with problems which present psychiatrically, and both are radical and perhaps irreversible, but 
there is still some difference between neural surgery and the destruction of the function of a 
limb. Neurosurgery is at least surgery on the diseased organ, one might say, whereas there is no 
obviously diseased body part in the case of BIID. The problem, on this view, could be argued 
not to be psychiatry through surgery as such, but psychiatry through this surgery. 
                                                 
36 Elliott, Better than Well, 208-36. Elliott concedes that his attitudes to a surgical response to BIID have shifted since 
meeting people wanting elective amputation. Contrast Wesley J. Smith’s less sympathetic views, commenting on 
Bayne and Levy’s 2005 article: ‘If you want to see why Western culture is going badly off the rails, just read the 
drivel that passes for learned discourse in many of our professional journals ... That this kind of article is published 
in a respectable philosophical journal tells us how very radical and pathologically non judgmental the bioethics 
movement is becoming’ (‘Should Doctors Amputate Healthy Limbs?’, http://www.cbc-network.org/2006/11/ 
should-doctors-amputate-healthy-limbs/ (accessed 12 March 2013). 
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 To take this second claim first, it is surely at least as easy to argue that they are not so far 
apart in moral significance. Both kinds of surgery have significant adverse consequences, and it is 
not obvious that one is proportionately worse than the other relative to the seriousness of the 
conditions they are each addressing. The most one could concede to the point is that if a 
resolution of the psychological distress of BIID could be found by operating on the brain rather 
than amputating a limb, this would be medically indicated. But the detailed neurological 
knowledge needed for this is precisely what is not currently available; the question we are faced 
with now is how to act in our current, limited state of knowledge. 
 More importantly, we should observe that if BIID is the result of some specifically 
neurological malformation or anomaly, that is, some unambiguously physical cause, we cannot 
interpret surgery for BIID as simply refusing to accept the preferred status of the biological, or 
as a wilful disregard of the structures of the body in pursuit of cultural or psychological fantasies. 
Rather it looks more like intervention in a body that is at war with itself, where one organ is in 
conflict with another, the head saying to the feet, ‘I have no need of you’ (1 Cor. 12.21). The 
body does not here point unequivocally to the goodness of creation, but has in its divided nature 
also become a sign of the fallen creation, a fall which may have originated in the disobedience of 
the will but which in the increased pains of childbirth is shown also to have bodily consequences. 
In a case such as this, it is much less clear what the practice of healing, as a sign both of the 
restoration of the creation and the fulfilment of the kingdom, might look like. Of course it is 
proper medical practice that all less radical alternatives should be pursued first – psychiatric, 
pharmaceutical, non-impairing. But in our current, limited state of knowledge, it is not evident 
that it must necessarily preclude the possibility of amputation in some occasional cases. As in the 
instruction to Catholic hospitals about lobotomy, the determining factor would be the welfare of 
the patient himself or herself, considered as a person; the totality which the mutilation would 
serve would be the whole person, body and soul. 
 
Surgical interventions for identity disorders? 
 
 This might provide a limited justification for surgical therapy for BIID. But an anxiety 
still remains. Even if such surgery were on occasions defensible in principle, might it not yet be 
doubtful because of the circumstances in which it would be practiced? This returns us to the 
question of the cultural narrative within which BIID is set. One of the concerns behind 
affirming that psychological suffering could warrant drastic surgery lies in the perception that 
this would represent a further step in the direction of the instrumentalisation and 
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consumerisation of the body. Once we accept the principle that we may provide surgical 
solutions to emotional distress, what other practices might we also find ourselves legitimating? 
How are we to prevent the ever increasing medical colonisation of our cultural imagination, 
driven (it should be noted) not so much by the calculated expansion of medical power as by the 
impatient expectations of the patient-consumer? This trend is amplified and given philosophical 
voice in those conceptions of autonomy, such as those of Savulescu, which not only defend the 
capacity for informed consent, but also make claims on medicine to supply whatever individuals 
may demand. On such accounts, surgery for BIID is folded into the category of consumer 
choice, as a lifestyle preference or a form of self-realization, even if no doubt an extreme and 
rare one. 
 The concern is compounded by the proposed categorization of the desire for elective 
impairment as an ‘identity disorder’. The notion of one’s ‘identity’ is remarkably fluid, and is 
perhaps peculiar to the modern West; it is arguably little surprise, and it says little about its 
usefulness as a cross-cultural psychological or psychiatric classification, that people in modern 
English-speaking cultures resort to the language of identity and identity disorder, since this is 
precisely the language that we habitually reach for when handling this kind of issue. The danger 
with novel categories of psychiatric diagnosis is that under the guise of supposed scientific 
impartiality they may impose on others patterns of behaviour, of perception and feeling, which 
are the local products of specific historical and cultural conditions. And because of the 
reciprocal, reflexive nature of the relation between people’s self-interpretations and the 
diagnostic categories available to them, especially when mediated through support groups, 
internet blogs, information sites, and the like, such classifications may end up structuring the 
ways in which people perform their mental torment in ways that preclude alternative 
interpretations. Indeed in general, as might be surmised from studies of other arguably transient 
psychiatric phenomena, our understanding of the significance of cultural context for the 
structure of experience is inchoate in the extreme.37 
 There are also particular reasons for unease here in relation to BIID. Not only are there 
significant unclarified issues in the choice of classification.38 The potential for abuse and for a 
                                                 
37 See Ian Hacking’s discussion of fugue states in nineteenth-century France and multiple personality disorder in late 
twentieth-century America in Mad Travellers: Reflections on the Reality of Mental Illnesses (London: Free Association 
Books, 1999) and Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1995). These are discussed in relation to BIID by Elliott, Better than Well, 227-34. 
38 Here it is striking that the current fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, the 
standard psychiatric classificatory instrument in use in the United States, defines two different kinds of identity 
disorder, Dissociative Identity Disorder (formerly Multiple Personality Disorder) and Gender Identity Disorder, but 
does not define ‘identity disorder’ as such (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV (Washington, 
DC: American Psychiatric Association, 1994)). It is perhaps even more striking that the WHO’s classificatory 
system, which is more widely used internationally, does not contain the category of identity disorder (see The ICD-10 
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consumerisation of surgery is also magnified by a significant number of ‘wannabes’ who are 
unresolved about precisely which amputation they are seeking, and therefore might end up 
having several physically successful but psychologically unfulfilling amputations;39 as well as by 
the possibility some might choose to downplay or deny a sexual dimension of their feelings in 
order to secure the desired surgery. Perhaps most importantly, the adoption of an official 
psychiatric classification might end up essentializing the experience, ossifying in some people a 
quasi-positivist self-understanding that precluded the possibility of any alternative accounts of 
their situation. It might leave them grasping onto their identity as sufferers from BIID as the 
deepest truth about themselves, clinging to the possibility of surgical intervention as their sole 
hope of salvation, and unable to ask even in principle whether there were any alternatives. 
 All of these are real reasons for concern, and would have to be taken into account before 
any settled understanding of the phenomenon or final reckoning of the morality of elective 
amputation were reached. The historical trajectory to which a technological and autonomist 
culture seems irrevocably committed is one about which anyone concerned with humane values 
should entertain suspicion. Nevertheless the spacious panorama which the grand historical 
narrative opens up should not eclipse the views afforded by the petits récits. The lived realities of 
those people whose autobiographies have been marked by the intense desire to be rid of a 
healthy body part deserve to be considered in their own terms, rather than being assumed to play 
a mere bit part in a wider story, and a questionable one at that. They need not be interpreted as 
lending themselves, whether intentionally or inadvertently, to endless vistas of arbitrary bodily 
reinvention or florid fantasies about perpetual self-creation. 
 However if it is the case that such surgery need not be co-opted into a narrative of 
technological annihilation of the body, if it is possible to bear witness to the fundamental 
goodness of the body even as one entertains seriously the possibility of eliminating a healthy 
body part, then those considering such an action need to recognize certain constraints. Rejection 
of an expansionist philosophy of autonomy does suggest certain ways of performing desire. 
Those who live with these desires would need to be open to the possibility of other ways of 
having their desires resolved than that of surgery. They would need to be willing to interrogate 
their desires, knowing that desires can be deceptive and that the literal fulfilment of desire might 
                                                                                                                                                        
Classification of Mental and Behavioural Disorders: Clinical Descriptions and Diagnostic Guidelines (Geneva: World Health 
Organization, 1992)). Nor did Michael First offer any views on the matter in proposing the term ‘Body Integrity 
Identity Disorder’ (First, ‘Desire for Amputation of a Limb’). For a defence of the language of identity disorder 
here, see Avi Craimer, ‘The Relevance of Identity in Responding to BIID and the Misuse of Causal Explanation’, 
American Journal of Bioethics 9 (2009), 53-5. 
39 Erich Kasten, ‘Body Integrity Identity Disorder (BIID): Befragung von Betroffenen und Erklärungsansätze’, 
Fortschritte der Neurologie Psychiatrie 77 (2009), 16-24, who on the grounds of the roving target of amputation within 
some individuals finds reason for questioning the neurological account of BIID. 
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not be identical with the true fulfilment of desire. They would need to refuse the fatalism of 
assuming that the only solution to the desire to have the limb amputated is to have the limb 
amputated. They would need to wary of tying themselves to a particular identity if that 
identification reified their predicament and made intelligible only one solution. If – 
hypothetically – the option were available, they would need to be open to the possibility of losing 
the desire for surgery rather than losing part of their body. 
 Of course for many the option of losing the desire for surgery, however theoretically 
attractive it might be, remains consistently alien to their experience. They may have lived with 
their feelings for as long as they can remember, and may not know what it would be like to 
experience life without them. They may well know the emotional cost of failed efforts to 
distance themselves from their feelings and the seeming impossibility of doing so, and thence the 
attraction of seeking surgery. For them, if they were finally to request surgery, recognition of the 
integrity of the body would also evoke appropriate attitudes. They would not assume that 
amputation would be a genuine and final ‘cure’, rather than just a treatment of their symptoms 
which will likely bring other problems in train. They would not hope that a diagnosis and surgery 
would provide a final solution of all their life’s concerns, but would merely provide the basis for 
a liveable way forward, a modicum of peace. 
 
Body integrity and the body of Christ 
 
 I emphasize the element of choice in performing one’s desires in order to avoid the 
danger of essentializing the experience, a danger which may intensify when the dominant 
available categorizations use the language of identity. Not all ways of responding to an 
experience are equal, and some may be genuinely less enclosed, less fatalistic, more self-aware, 
more liberating than others. Moreover, whether wittingly or not, some may reflect better than 
others the final truth of human identity as it is displayed in baptism into Christ. For baptism does 
not confirm us in our identities but is the crisis of all human identities; baptism reveals the reality 
of a human identity disorder of a depth inaccessible to any diagnostic manual or psychiatric 
assessment; it directs us to follow one who did not lay claim to his identity as something to be 
clung on to; and it promises us new life as the bearers of his identity and members together of a 
liberated and complete body.  
 Would surgery for BIID be justified? No doubt we are not yet in a position to reach a 
mature conclusion on this. The church would certainly not be free if it were not free to make the 
judgement, No. But equally, I submit, it would not be free if it were not free to make the 
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judgement, Yes. And this, not as a concession to pastoral ‘necessity’, nor out of a misplaced 
emphasis on compassion as the sole ground of discernment. Nor, as I have suggested, need it 
derive from giving any ground to an autonomy-centred philosophy. Rather it would be based on 
a serious, principled attention to the welfare of the patient, considered as a person, which is not 
the same as a descent into a gnosticizing, historicizing rejection of the goodness of the body. 
There is a difference between an argument that we should allow surgery for BIID since we allow 
consumer demands over the body such as cosmetic surgery, and the recognition that we are here 
dealing with a genuine problem which may have no obvious organic cause and which is only 
accessible through people’s self-description, but for which surgery under certain circumstances 
might be a remedy. And the person who made that judgement out of responsibility towards their 
own health need not do so as someone appealing to their secure and self-dependent status as an 
autonomous individual, but might also do so as someone called to be an integral part of the body 
of Christ.40 
                                                 
40 I am grateful to Chris Cook, Gerard Loughlin, Susan Parsons, Jean Porter, Helen Savage, Brent Waters and 
Vanessa Williams for their comments on the themes of this paper. 
